

mana or as novelty items: some mills operated for years, and there were varying modes of ownership, other than just hapū based. Māori reacted to the market pragmatically, but economic changes greatly affected the social structure, particularly chiefly power already weakened by missionary-influenced change. Chiefs retained the cultural responsibilities of leading tribal projects (whether providing hospitality or purchasing a flourmill) but with less economic capability, whereas commoners were able to make and keep their own money. During this period Pākehā surpassed Māori in number, and gained self-government. Although the increasing settler population provided more mouths for Māori to feed, the balance of power had tilted towards Pākehā.

From 1856 Māori began to withdraw from the market, a significant historical development with repercussions for the subsequent armed conflict. Various historians have speculated on 'what went wrong'. For example, Belich and Parsonson imply that Māori were no longer excited by the novelty or mana of mills and ships; R.P. Hargreaves suggests that economic slump, maintenance problems with mills and ships, and weakened wheat strains led to Māori dissatisfaction with the new economy; Keith Sinclair asserts that Māori antipathy to Pākehā grew with the latter's demands for land, and that economic withdrawal represented growing Māori nationalism and a rejection of European mores; and David Pearson states that Pākehā competition drove Māori from the market place. Petrie only marginally engages with the historiography, but provides her own set of causes, suggesting first that Pākehā politicians made it difficult for Māori producers. This is unconvincing: while government subsidies to steam vessels no doubt undermined Māori shipping, the demand for produce in Auckland remained, with settlers having to import flour. She also asserts that increasing landlessness diminished economic power. While this became true, it was Waikato iwi, who still retained most of their land, who pulled out most significantly — most likely for political rather than economic reasons. Petrie also asserts that Māori sold considerable amounts of land to buy mills and ships, even suggesting that because 'during Grey's first governorship 32,634,769 acres were purchased for a total of £61,847 or an average of £1 per 527 acres' that a £400 ship was equivalent to 210,800 acres. This calculation is severely distorted by the huge South Island purchases: for North Island groups such a vessel would have been a fraction of that figure. It is more likely, as Petrie's own data shows, that most Māori made the money, or went into debt, to effect large purchases.

*Chiefs of Industry* is a valuable addition to Māori history. Notwithstanding any reservations on how it explains why Māori commerce collapsed, the book offers sound theories on why and how Māori engaged in the market in early colonial New Zealand. It also provides copious examples from the primary data that will be of great interest to social and economic historians.

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*Wealthmakers: A History of the Northern Employers' and Manufacturers' Associations.* By Selwyn Parker. Employers & Manufacturers Association (Northern) Inc., Auckland, 2005. 368 pp. NZ price: \$49.95. ISBN 0-473-10334-6.

THE AUCKLAND MANUFACTURERS' ASSOCIATION commenced in 1886 (initially called the New Zealand Industrial Association) and the Auckland Provincial Employers' Association in 1901. In 1996, the two organizations combined forces to become the Employers and Manufacturers Association (Northern).

The founding of such associations was part of a national and international move to galvanize promoters and proprietors into administrative and informational bodies

to better represent their interests. Predating the manufacturers' and employer bodies in New Zealand, and on the back of chambers of commerce commencing in Sydney, Melbourne and Hobart, Auckland and Wellington formed chambers in 1856 (Canterbury and Otago followed in 1859 and 1861 respectively). Similarly, the Incorporated Institute of Accountants was formed in New Zealand in 1894, 40 years after the original institution commenced in the United Kingdom.

All such groups had a similar thrust: they sought to advance and support the various concerns and interests of their members. While the chambers of commerce typically drew their membership from merchant, shipping and banking interests, providing information on customs regulations, wharf charges, international shipping, agencies, postal charges and tariffs, the manufacturers' associations, formed initially in New Zealand in Christchurch in 1879 (called the Industrial Association of Canterbury), and thereafter in Dunedin, Wellington and Auckland, drew membership from factories and industrial concerns — brick and tile manufacture, watchmaking, coach building, coal range manufacture, beer production, boot and shoe production and many more. From the outset, and directly juxtaposed to the chambers of commerce, a primary aim of manufacturers' associations was the imposition of duties on imported goods so as to protect and encourage local manufacture and employment.

Provincial employers' associations also drew membership from across the board and provided information to their members on the meaning and intent of new laws, rates of pay, accident insurance, wages and the like.

Selwyn Parker's book provides some of the colour and machinations behind the formation, then progression, of these two complementary organizations. Protectionism, labour unrest, strikes and government emerge as the main themes. In some respects, this is to be expected in a work of this nature. The 1890 maritime strike, the 1951 waterfront dispute, post-war protectionism and lobbying, the industrial unrest and repetitive strikes of the 1980s, feature large in New Zealand's labour history. A feature of the book is the retelling of these disputes from the employer's side, countering the claims of labour and seeking, I think, to inject more of a balance into the reading of these events. Curiously, because of this, the book serves not only as a useful and interesting history of industrial organizations in New Zealand but also of labour organizations.

Usefully, Parker demonstrates how the rhetoric employed by early labour organizations was borrowed from an old world industrial context, which, while it boiled the blood, did not characterize New Zealand industry. The exploitation of human labour, where young girls worked 90 hours over seven days for a penny an hour, did not typify New Zealand-style industrial capitalism. As Parker correctly writes: '[New Zealand capitalism] was overwhelmingly exemplified by a handful of long serving employees, probably members of craft-type unions, working in small firms alongside owners who treated them with respect and decency and paid them as well as they could'. Many of these were family firms where the gap between management and personnel, as Tom Brooking has shown, was uniquely trivial.

Parker has done his research well. *Wealthmakers* brings to light fascinating details about New Zealand's commercial history that have previously lain unearched and undiscussed to any great measure. International incongruities are one example. During the 1929–1936 depression, for instance, he points out that New Zealand ran a 'no protection' policy in the early years, admitting substantial quantities of American and Japanese goods, while New Zealand exports to these countries were blocked by punitive duties. All primary produce to the United States was shut out — even a duty on onions of £9 per ton was imposed while in New Zealand the duty on American onions was 30 shillings per ton.

Parker points out the important role played by trade missions in the 1970s led by leading industrialists, such as appliance manufacturer Sir Woolf Fisher and leather goods manufacturer Fred Turnovsky. They resulted in real orders for New Zealand