

statutes (and treaties?) had to be construed as they were understood by the legislature at the time of their passage, F. Chapman, were he alive, could make an interesting contribution to the current Waitangi industry.

Frederick Chapman was a member of most organizations devoted to the advancement of knowledge, a keen collector of Maori artifacts and, as vice-president of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science, initiated the move to name the area of the Pacific Ocean between Australia and New Zealand the Tasman Sea. As a judge he is shown to have a direct and down-to-earth approach, making use of his working knowledge of many languages and his knowledge of both English and Australian law.

The book is well printed by the Victoria University Press, and is well illustrated, but has the annoying feature of far too much interesting information being tucked away in reference notes at the end of the book. There is no bibliography and the index yields only page numbers. What Dr Spiller has done is to picture for us three veritable giants in the realm of New Zealand law and, more particularly in the case of Frederick, to give an interesting, narrowly focused, single-sex, glimpse of times now gone and of life styles no longer possible. The broader picture will require wider research.

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Independence and Foreign Policy. New Zealand in the world since 1935. By Malcolm McKinnon. Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1993. xiv, 329 pp. NZ price: \$34.95.

MALCOLM MCKINNON'S *Independence and Foreign Policy* is an example of historical writing at its best: stylish, thoughtful, ideologically unblinkered, generously drawing from a range of studies, unostentatiously displaying extensive exploration of the literature and some hard slog in primary sources. With some 300 pages of text and nearly 30 pages of bibliography, appendix and index, it is a substantial work. It is avowedly, and necessarily, a survey volume. McKinnon does not seek to write revisionist history, although he is determined to look coolly and carefully at the record of over half a century, not merely to chorus approval for each time New Zealand steps out of line.

Reflections and observations upon concepts of 'independence' provide the study with a loose coherence. McKinnon sees New Zealand's pursuit of independence in terms of an interplay of loyal dissent and vigorous defence of interest — 'speaking up' — within a wider framework, an accepted distribution of power. And by the end, while continuing to seek and to find continuities, at a time when the Commonwealth had ceased to be central to New Zealand views of the world, he boldly discerns a catalyst in the ANZUS crisis, leading to a 'nationalist phenomenon . . . different in kind and not just degree from the ideas of independence' of the past: 'power now informs the notion of independence'.

McKinnon presents a thoughtful examination of how New Zealand, through its official spokespeople, expressed and pursued 'independent' policy, and their differing approaches to independence over the decades as the framework or context changed. He shows no sign of ever falling into the error of perceiving history as the product of Great Men: his study is not an attempt to find how New Zealand's officials and politicians came to adopt particular stances — it is conclusions, not discussion, that interest McKinnon. Nor is there a comparative dimension. The result is what might be deemed a 'clean' text:

without doubts or hesitancy, New Zealand moves on its unique path through history.

There are some disappointing and avoidable blemishes. An index entry may comprise a string of undifferentiated page numbers, and while the index is impressively full, it does not lack chaotic features. In quite a few cases it appears a matter of chance whether a person achieves index status, or whether, having achieved such status, he or she will be indexed for every reference. There is an occasional mistake which should have been picked up: for example the listing of Frank O'Flynn as Foreign Affairs Minister 1984-87 and, most strikingly, a statement that the French agents caught after the *Rainbow Warrior* affair were never brought to trial. These particular mistakes probably reflect the fact that the work moves from decades heavily researched to less heavily researched commentary on more recent years. There can also be disconcerting jumps in the narrative. Sometimes individuals flit across the page dropping an apt remark or simply expressing a viewpoint, and then disappear from sight. Footnote citations often make little concession to the casual reader. An entire book may be given as a reference, a citation so abbreviated that its meaning has to be tracked down.

The work should be commended not as a trailblazer but as a well-rounded, nicely expressed, commentary on New Zealand's external relations since 1935. Anyone wishing to explore some facet of New Zealand foreign policy in this period would find this an excellent starting point for study — once having grasped the broad background which is rather taken for granted — and will be grateful for the extensive citations and full bibliography. This will be a book students of foreign policy will want to read and will like to quote.

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New Zealand and the Korean War, Volume 1: Politics and Diplomacy. By Ian McGibbon. Oxford University Press in association with the Historical Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, Auckland, 1992. 468 pp. NZ price: \$69.95

THIS IS, without doubt, the best book written so far on New Zealand's external affairs. Although Kayforce was only a bit player in the 21-nation coalition which went to the rescue of South Korea under the banner of the United Nations in 1950 (and it was known as the 'forgotten force'), New Zealand's contribution, as a proportion of population, was second only to that of the United States. McGibbon shows that this contribution was also a most significant episode in the evolution of New Zealand's role in world affairs. The book deserves the highest praise and a wide readership because of five virtues.

Firstly, it provides clear judgement on the causes and course of the war. It is divided into two parts. The first deals with the North Korean invasion, the UN forces' retreat to Pusan, the Inchon landings and the recovery of South Korea. At the time, it was believed that World War III was about to begin, that Korea was a Soviet-inspired diversion before assaults on the Middle East and Western Europe. Revisionist historians later tried to argue that South Korea engineered the war. McGibbon sees 'overwhelming circumstantial evidence' that Kim Il-Sung, the North Korean leader, planned the attack. He says that the 'case for Chinese instigation is not strong' and that the Soviet Union, while willing to go along with the adventure, had urged caution. The second part of the book deals with the period after October 1950, when UN forces attempted to re-unify Korea, which led to