

major importance. The stress is on basic economic concepts and their validity is not geographically confined.

Though this book will probably not be found useful by most history students in New Zealand, it would be in a better world. Let me quote with approval Professor Hawke's final words in this book: 'Many historians doubt the value of economic theory. But it is difficult to think of one familiar with economics who does not find it useful; nor is it likely—at least not until economic theory becomes so well-known that its distinctive contribution is difficult to recognise' (p.214).

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*Beyond New Zealand: The Foreign Policy of a Small State.* Edited by John Henderson, Keith Jackson and Richard Kennaway. Methuen, Auckland, 1980. 270pp. N.Z. price: \$14.95.

THIS IS one of the now numerous books not created by a writer, a researcher—a mind—seeking to communicate with a public, but concocted to meet a market. It is a 'book of readings' on New Zealand policy, aimed, presumably, at students of international relations.

It is edited by three Canterbury political scientists—though how three people can edit a book is unknown to me. In the introduction John Henderson seeks to establish a new way of looking at New Zealand foreign policy, as the foreign policy of a small state. Small state theorists have identified various characteristics of small state behaviour, such as an emphasis on economic foreign policy and a moral emphasis. But this attempt to give the book a theoretical structure is only occasionally followed up by the contributors, who include diplomats, a peace activist and journalists as well as academics.

There are 43 articles on the historical and global setting, defence, trade, internationalism, the Pacific, New Zealand and Asia, and the making of foreign policy. This will be a useful reference book for students writing essays. But, taken as a whole, the book is a mish-mash. Some of the articles are so sketchy as to be trivial—notably the three pages on relations with Australia, which ought to be a major topic. Richard Kennaway devotes five pages to the great power context and five to New Zealand and the E.E.C. Peter Jones, who is identified as a British Quaker, writes peace propaganda. Most of the articles are sound but, like Keith Jackson's on the Vietnam war, very thin. There are a number of good articles, especially Luke Trainor's on sport and Gleneagles, Tom Larkin on Japan, and John Henderson's several contributions. As a whole, the book is a lucky dip.

When I returned from World War II, after studying at Chatham House, London, I joined the Institute of International Affairs. In Auckland, at least, only W.T.G. Airey, R.M. Chapman, myself and a handful of others gave a serious and sustained attention to foreign relations. Such a book as this, with its numerous academic contributors, could not have been written. It is a testimony

to the growing role of the universities in the community. There are articles by staff from five universities.

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*Blue-Water Rationale: The Naval Defence of New Zealand 1914-1942.* By I.C. McGibbon. Government Printer, Wellington, 1981. 446pp. N.Z. price: \$45.00.

THIS IS a good book with a needlessly obscure title. The 'blue-water' strategists argued that the defence of the British Empire depended on the command of the sea. This would be achieved by the main fleet, which could sail anywhere and thus deter an enemy or, in the last resort, destroy his fleet. The central idea of New Zealand's defence policy in the period covered was that the Dominion's security depended on the deterrent and destructive power of the British fleet. New Zealand therefore contributed, in its small way, to British naval strategy.

McGibbon has written the best book to appear yet on New Zealand defence policy. He does not pretend to write a history of the New Zealand Division of the R.N., though he summarizes the main developments. He does not set out to cover the whole of defence policy, but he manages to include the main landmarks in air and army policy. His main concern is the Dominion's contribution to, debates over, and, eventually, doubts about, the strategy of 'Imperial Defence'.

New Zealand's contributions began with the New Zealand Division of the Navy in 1913-14, the activities of her seamen on the *Philomel* 1914-17, and the revived Division from 1921. Massey was disappointed when Jellicoe's proposal for a new Pacific Fleet of sixteen capital ships to match Japan's was turned down in favour of building the Singapore Naval Base, which was to service the 'main fleet' if it were needed in the Pacific. Nevertheless New Zealand contributed £1 million towards the cost of the base and continued to support the strategy long after the rise of Hitler and Mussolini made a two-ocean conflict possible. However McGibbon shows that from 1932 to 1933 a few New Zealand planners were increasingly worried about the 'period before relief' of Singapore, but they were never able to produce an alternative strategy. Even after Labour came to power in 1935 to seek 'collective security' through the League of Nations and the building-up of a separate New Zealand airforce, the Imperial strategy was not abandoned. While the impact of air power led to the evolution of a 'regional effort' in the South Pacific to defend Fiji and to provide reconnaissance among the islands, the new air force was also designed to fly to Singapore and supply pilots for the defence of Britain. With the army geared up for expeditionary forces all three services, on the eve of World War II, were still intended for 'Imperial Defence'.

McGibbon has written an accurate, detailed and scholarly account of this theme and provides a lot of material on such matters as the naval treaty system and the imperial conferences. He gives the lie to the suggestion that New Zealand defence policy was 'made in London'. Far from accepting British direction uncritically, successive prime ministers, chiefs of staff and, more especially, Carl